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There has been very little overt discussion of the experimental philosophy 
of logic or mathematics. So it may be tempting to assume that application of 
the methods of experimental philosophy to logic or the philosophy of 
mathematics is impractical or unavailing. That this would be a mistake is 
exhibited by at least three trends in recent research: a renewed interest in 
historical antecedents of experimental philosophy in philosophical logic; a 
‘practice turn’ in the philosophies of mathematics and logic; and 
philosophical interest in a substantial body of work in adjacent disciplines, 
such as the psychology of reasoning and mathematics education. Before 
turning to the specific contribution that we hope this book will make, we will 
offer a snapshot of each trend and address how they intersect with some of 
the standard criticisms of experimental philosophy. Firstly, although 
experimental philosophy is often thought of as a twenty-first-century 
phenomenon primarily focussed on questions in ethics and epistemology, it 
has some important anticipations in earlier projects in the philosophy of 
logic. The most significant is the work of Arne Naess and the Oslo Group 
(Naess, 1938, 1959, 1982; Tönnessen, 1951). For instance, Ingemund 
Gullvåg argued that to understand the meaning of a word such as ‘truth’, it 
was ‘hardly sufficient that a single person registers his own reactions to this 
or that sentence, or makes pronouncements based on intuitions’ (Gullvåg, 
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1955, 343). Instead, the Oslo group argued, systematic empirical 
investigations were required. The connections between the ‘empirical 
semantics’ developed by the Oslo group and experimental philosophy have 
now begun to be made explicit by historians of philosophy and further 
developed by a new generation of researchers (Murphy, 2014; Barnard and 
Ulatowski, 2016; Chapman, 2018). This productive connection between the 
empirical methods of two different generations is continued in Barnard and 
Ulatowski’s chapter in the present volume, discussed in greater detail below. 
Secondly, in recent decades there has been a ‘practice turn’ in the 
philosophy of mathematics, focussing on how mathematical research is 
actually conducted, rather than on the search for foundations for mathematics 
(Van Kerkhove and Van Bendegem, 2007; Mancosu, 2008). This has 
naturally led to an interest in empirical data about mathematical practice, a 
programme dubbed ‘Empirical Philosophy of Mathematics’ by some of its 
practitioners (Buldt et al., 2008; Löwe et al., 2010; Pantsar, 2015). There are 
several distinct axes along which the connections between the philosophy of 
mathematical practice and empirical work have been drawn. A significant 
body of work applies cognitive science research on mathematical reasoning 
to philosophical questions (Pease et al., 2013). This includes work on the 
status of mathematical knowledge (Cappelletti and Giardino, 2007; Pantsar, 
2014); on the symbol systems of mathematics (De Cruz and De Smedt, 2013; 
Dutilh Novaes, 2013; Marghetis and Núñez, 2013); and on the role of 
diagrams and visualization in mathematics (Giaquinto, 2007; Hamami and 
Mumma, 2013). Moreover, modern mathematicians increasingly employ 
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potential data for researchers interested in mathematical practice, giving rise 
to another strategy for the investigation of that practice (Martin and Pease, 
2013; Martin, 2015; Pease et al., 2017). Although logical practice may have 
received less attention than its mathematical counterpart, some researchers in 
the philosophy of logic have pursued a practice turn of their own, modelled 
on that in the philosophy of mathematics (Dutilh Novaes, 2012). As with its 
sister programme in philosophy of mathematics, advocates of the philosophy 
of logical practice stress that too much attention has been paid to 
foundational issues at the expense of philosophical questions that arise 
elsewhere, such as in the application of logic to artificial intelligence, game 
theory, linguistics, and other disciplines. For example, the burgeoning 
research programme of ‘argumentation mining’, which applies corpus-based 
techniques to extract and analyse arguments across large bodies of text, may 
be seen as a logical counterpart to the use of big data techniques in analysis 
of mathematical practice (Moens, 2018). 
Thirdly, there is a growing awareness of how much research in adjacent 
disciplines has anticipated the research questions of experimental philosophy 
of logic and mathematics. Philosophers of logic have an extensive body of 
research on the psychology of reasoning to draw upon (Johnson-Laird, 
2006). Lately, some work in the intersection of philosophy of logic and 
psychology of reasoning has made the relationship to experimental 
philosophy explicit (Pfeifer, 2012; Pfeifer and Douven, 2014; Ripley, 2016). 
There is also a substantial research tradition in mathematics education that 
addresses questions of immediate relevance to the philosophy of 
mathematical practice (Heinze, 2010; Weber et al., 2014; Weber and Mejía-
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Ramos, 2015; Alcock et al., 2016). Understanding mathematical practice is 
important for education researchers for at least two reasons. First, 
understanding the behaviour of expert mathematicians helps to decide what 
the purpose of a mathematics curriculum should be. If a particular activity is 
highly valued in expert mathematical practice then this perhaps provides a 
reason for mathematics students to be exposed to some appropriate version of 
it (see, for example, Ball and Bass, 2000; Harel and Sowder, 2007; Lampert, 
1990; Weber et al., 2014). Second, studying the in-the-moment strategies 
adopted by expert practitioners (in any domain) might provide suggestions 
for how to develop interventions that assist learners to develop expertise. An 
example of this approach can be found in the work of Alcock, Hodds, Roy 
and Inglis (2015). They studied the reading behaviour of research 
mathematicians, and used these insights to develop training materials that 
encouraged undergraduates to adopt similar strategies. These training 
materials significantly increased the amount students learned from reading a 
mathematical text. 
In addition, there is now an emerging tradition of interdisciplinary work, 
applying quantitative techniques to address traditionally philosophical 
questions, such as mathematical aesthetics (Inglis and Aberdein, 2015, 2016). 
Some of this work has been presented as an enquiry into ‘mathematical 
cultures’ (Löwe, 2016; Larvor, 2016). Likewise, Reuben Hersh, one of the 
forerunners of the practice turn, has lately called for ‘a unified, distinct 
scholarly activity of mathematics studies: the study of mathematical activity 
and behavior’ (Hersh, 2017, 335). We regard the present volume as, in part, a 
contribution to the integrative work required for this project. 
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The advent of experimental philosophy has not been without controversy 
and has provoked a salutary debate on the proper methods of philosophical 
enquiry. One of the most prominent critiques is the ‘expertise defence’ of 
traditional philosophical practice (Nado, 2014; Mizrahi, 2015). This 
maintains that surveys of non-philosophers have limited bearing on the 
arguments of philosophers since, as experts, philosophers can be expected to 
be immune from the errors and biases exhibited by non-experts. This debate 
has given rise to a substantial literature. However, the experimental 
philosophies of mathematics and logic seem to have ready responses to the 
expertise defence. Many studies of mathematical practice focus on 
professional mathematicians, placing the expertise of the participants 
essentially beyond dispute. Nonetheless, this is not universally true; for 
instance, some philosophers (for example, De Cruz, 2016) have used results 
from the numerical cognition literature to draw conclusions about the 
ontology of natural numbers. Participants in numerical cognition studies 
include non-mathematical adults, children and even non-human animals.  
An important difference between mainstream experimental philosophy 
and work focused on mathematics is that studies in the latter tradition 
typically ask their participants—be they mathematicians, children or 
animals—about mathematics, not about philosophy. (This is just as well, for 
in Hersh’s famous formulation, ‘the typical working mathematician is a 
Platonist on weekdays and a formalist on Sundays’ (Hersh, 1979, 32). Such 
insouciance would not bode well for the resolution of philosophical 
dilemmas.) In this respect experimental philosophy of mathematics is similar 
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to psychological work on reasoning relevant to debates in the philosophy of 
logic. Here too participants are typically drawn from a more general 
population. (Although there clearly is such a thing as logical expertise; for a 
start, people can be trained to be better at logical reasoning (Attridge et al., 
2016).) Just as mathematicians/children/fish are asked about mathematics not 
philosophy, participants in reasoning studies are asked object-level questions 
about everyday reasoning, not specialised questions about logical hypotheses 
that might predict or explain such reasoning. On this basis David Ripley has 
argued that these studies are better placed to answer the expertise objection 
than studies relevant to debates in ethics or epistemology (Ripley, 2016). 
Nonetheless, there is a substantial body of psychological research that 
reveals a divergence between best practice in reasoning (at least, as defined 
by logicians) and how lay people actually reason. There is also a substantial 
body of work critiquing these results. Broadly speaking, they lend 
themselves to four possible responses:  
1. Lay people are to blame: they routinely make damaging errors in their 
inferential practices;  
2. Psychologists are to blame: they fail to understand the relationship 
between formal and informal reasoning, and thereby design 
experiments which show only that good reasoners can be hoodwinked 
by artificial examples;  
3. Logicians are to blame: they persist in defending systems of formal 
inference which do not describe the legitimate inferential practices of 
ordinary folk;  
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4. No one is to blame: logicians might well be right that formal logic is 
the best way to reason, but in many (perhaps most) real world 
circumstances it takes too much cognitive effort to do so.  
Many such studies, especially in early psychology of reasoning work, are 
presented as supporting the first response. However, they can often be 
reinterpreted in support of one of the others. In particular, much research of 
this sort is implicitly deductivist (and often classicist): it presumes that the 
best account of human inference will always be deductive logic (and often 
that classical logic is the best or only viable system of deductive logic). 
Hence such work is undermined by the successful modelling of informal, 
non-deductive patterns of inference in argumentation theory (Zenker, 2018) 
or non-classical logics (Aberdein and Read, 2009). The moral may be that, as 
with many sciences, theoretical and empirical approaches should be mutually 
reinforcing: logicians need the empirical research conducted by 
psychologists of reasoning to corroborate their claim of faithfulness to actual 
reasoning; psychology of reasoning needs to be informed by current research 
in logic if it is to stay relevant. 
Recent research suggests that even preverbal children can exhibit 
behaviour consistent with logical reasoning (Cesana-Arlotti et al., 2018). 
Children as young as twelve months were presented with stimuli either 
complying with or violating simple inferential rules, such as disjunctive 
syllogism, p∨q,¬p⊢q. That they looked longer at violating cases than they 
did at stimuli consistent with those rules, just as adults do, suggests that they 
found those cases incongruous. This provides an echo of a far older debate. 
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The ancient logician Chrysippus argued that dogs employ disjunctive 
syllogism, since a scent hound, tracking a quarry to a crossroads and 
eliminating all but one of the exits, will (or so Chrysippus claims) 
immediately take the last exit without further checks of the trail. The story 
has been retold many times, with at least four different morals:  
1. dogs use logic, so they are as clever as humans;  
2. dogs use logic, so using logic is nothing special;  
3. dogs reason well enough without logic;  
4. dogs reason better for not having logic (for details, see Aberdein, 
2008).  
The third option may be closest to Chrysippus’s own; it may also be the best 
take on the empirical research. That is, such studies do not attribute 
conscious, reflective awareness of any system of logic to dogs (or infants). 
Rather, they demonstrate that logic succeeds in tracking the pre-theoretical 
reasoning not just of the logically educated, but of pretty much anyone 
capable of rational thought. 
It is sometimes argued that logic, as an a priori discipline, is immune 
from revisionary pressures that apply to natural science. If this is so, then 
there may be little room for empirical research in logic. On the other hand, 
there is a tradition, associated with W. V. O. Quine in particular, of treating 
logic as continuous with the natural sciences (Bryant, 2017). In recent years, 
this debate has been characterized in terms of ‘anti-exceptionalism’ about 
logic (Hjortland, 2017; Read, 2018). However, we do not need to resolve the 
debate in order to observe that it is less damaging to our concerns than it may 
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first appear. Even if one concedes that the truths of logic are analytic and 
necessary—that is, true in virtue of their meaning and such that they could 
not have been different—our knowledge of these truths is still fallible. So we 
may expect the methods whereby we come to know these truths to have 
much in common with the methods whereby we learn truths in the natural 
sciences, even though the truths of those disciplines are neither analytic nor 
necessary. 
 
This collection is intended to consolidate and develop the three trends 
identified above: the reappraisal of the Oslo Group; the practice turn in the 
philosophies of logic and mathematics; and the reintegration into these 
philosophies of empirical work from adjacent disciplines. The ten chapters 
are divided equally between the philosophies of mathematics and logic. Their 
authors include some of the leading figures in each of the areas of research 
discussed above. Several chapters are methodological analyses of the 
applicability of empirical techniques to these areas of philosophy, but many 
(also) include actual empirical results. They demonstrate a wide variety of 
different empirical methods, including experiments, surveys, and data-
mining. 
Benedikt Löwe and Bart Van Kerkhove’s chapter, ‘Methodological 
triangulation in empirical philosophy of mathematics’, is written by two of 
the leading figures in the philosophy of mathematical practice. They survey 
the uses that have been found for a variety of different empirical methods in 
philosophy, emphasising that the experimental method in the strict sense is 
only one of them. They argue for methodological triangulation in empirical 
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philosophy, that is, the employment of a battery of different empirical 
methods to compensate for the biases and limitations implicit in any one of 
them. Their paper provides a helpful introduction to the potential that 
empirical methods offer for the philosopher of mathematics (or logic). In 
particular, they rehearse a sartorial analogy that Löwe has proposed 
elsewhere for the different levels of integration between philosophy and 
empirical methods (Löwe, 2016, 36). He distinguishes ‘ready-to-wear’, the 
philosophical exploitation of existing, independently conducted empirical 
research, from ‘bespoke’, which involves more direct collaboration, such as 
philosophers designing projects to be conducted by empirical researchers, 
and ‘do-it-yourself’ (homespun?), in which the philosopher conducts all 
aspects of the research. (We might add that such cross-disciplinary work can 
cut both ways: empirical researchers can develop the interest and expertise 
necessary to address philosophical questions. Indeed, some philosophical 
questions, including many posed by the philosophies of mathematical and 
logical practice, are already within the remit of nearby empirical disciplines.) 
It is important to stress, as Löwe and Van Kerkhove do, that this is not a 
hierarchy of quality. If you are lucky enough to find off-the-peg clothes that 
are a good fit, they may be much better value than bespoke. And making 
your own clothes is unlikely to have a good outcome unless you acquire 
significant expertise. Likewise, when existing empirical studies address the 
right questions, ready-to-wear studies can be highly effective. The remaining 
chapters in this collection report on studies of all three varieties. 
Helen De Cruz’s work in the philosophy of mathematics has long made 
use of empirical results (De Cruz, 2006, 2016). Her chapter, ‘Animal 
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cognition, species invariantism and mathematical realism’, is a notable piece 
of ready-to-wear empirical philosophy. She uses a variety of results from 
numerical cognition (especially neurological and animal work) to tackle a 
recently influential argument in the philosophy of mathematics. The 
‘evolutionary debunking’ argument against moral realism suggests that our 
moral beliefs cannot be objectively true if they are the result of a highly 
contingent evolutionary process. If we had evolved from animals with very 
different social behaviour (and there are many such species) then we would 
have a quite different set of moral intuitions, so why imagine that those 
intuitions track the truth? Mathematical realism, the view that our 
mathematical beliefs are objectively true, has obvious similarities to moral 
realism. So might there not be an analogous evolutionary debunking 
argument against mathematical realism too? However, De Cruz demonstrates 
that there is significant evidence that the mathematical behaviour of animals 
is substantially convergent, which suggests that the analogy fails; if anything 
the empirical data provide support for mathematical realism. 
The next chapter, ‘The beauty (?) of mathematical proofs’, also makes 
extensive use of existing empirical research. We have already noted Catarina 
Dutilh Novaes’s research on logical practice; besides the history and 
philosophy of logic she also works on social epistemology and the 
philosophy of mathematics, as in this chapter. She coordinates a number of 
disparate literatures to propose a novel approach to the aesthetics of 
mathematical proof grounded in empirical work on affective responses to 
unexpectedness. The key idea is that in many situations mathematical 
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judgments bring together epistemic and aesthetic components, and that we 
should not be surprised by this. 
The next two chapters are drawn from the bespoke tradition: they report 
on original studies that were conducted by the authors to address (at least) 
philosophical questions. Both chapters look at aspects of visual reasoning in 
mathematics. This has been a controversial subject: an influential view 
maintains that visuals should play no role in mathematical proof, but a 
growing body of work suggests that this is an unrealistic, indeed harmful, 
idealization (Larvor, 2013, 2018). Josephine Relaford-Doyle and Rafael 
Núñez are both cognitive scientists—the latter is a co-author of a landmark in 
the application of cognitive science to mathematics (Lakoff and Núñez, 
2000). Their chapter, ‘Can a picture prove a theorem? Using empirical 
methods to investigate visual proofs by induction’, reports an empirical study 
that investigates how undergraduate students with and without formal 
mathematical training use images to justify mathematical claims. They focus 
on visual induction proofs, and find results that challenge James Brown’s 
(non-empirical) claim that such proofs are immediately understandable for 
people without mathematical training (Brown, 1997). 
Keith Weber and Juan Pablo Mejía-Ramos are mathematics educators. In 
their chapter, ‘An empirical study on the admissibility of graphical inferences 
in mathematical proofs’, they investigate the admissibility of graphical 
inferences in proofs in real analysis. They conclude that the type of graphical 
inference is important to consider when addressing their question. In 
particular, Weber and Mejía-Ramos find support for the importance of 
distinguishing between metrical and non-metrical graphical inferences 
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(Larvor, 2018). A metrical graphical inference is one that depends for its 
success on the measurements of angles, lengths, and so on, being precisely 
correct, whereas a non-metrical graphical inference does not; that is, the 
latter sort of inference is unaffected by local deformations in the diagrams at 
issue. 
Where the first five chapters focus primarily on the philosophy of 
mathematics, the remaining five concentrate on the philosophy of logic. In 
their chapter, ‘Does anyone really think that 〈⌜p⌝ is true if and only if p〉?’, 
the philosophers Robert Barnard and Joseph Ulatowski link together Arne 
Naess’s early empirical work, their own recent replications of some of these 
results, and the contemporary debate on deflationary accounts of truth. As 
well as noting this chapter’s contribution to philosophical theory, given the 
ongoing replication crisis in psychology (Chambers, 2017), it is worth 
explicitly remarking upon and celebrating Barnard and Ulatowski’s 
successful replication of Naess’s early findings.  
Igor Douven’s research lies at the intersection of several fields, including 
formal epistemology and cognitive science. His chapter, ‘New foundations 
for fuzzy set theory’, seeks to rehabilitate fuzzy set theory as an account of 
vagueness by grounding it in recent empirical work on conceptual spaces. 
Conceptual spaces were developed by the cognitive scientist Peter 
Gärdenfors as a geometrical framework for the qualitative comparison of 
concepts along multiple dimensions (Gärdenfors, 2000). Douven argues that 
seeing fuzzy membership as the distance of a point from a prototypical point 
in such a space is a productive approach to fuzzy set theory and, moreover, 
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that there is empirical support for adopting this view from work conducted 
by cognitive psychologists. 
The philosopher Moti Mizrahi’s chapter, ‘What isn’t obvious about 
“obvious”: A big data approach to philosophy of logic’, uses a corpus 
linguistics approach to investigate the obviousness or otherwise of logic. 
Mizrahi reasons that if logic really was obvious, then the frequency with 
which logicians use the word ‘obvious’ should correlate with deductive 
indicator words such as ‘necessary’ and ‘certainly’ but not with inductive 
indicator words such as ‘probably’ or ‘likely’. By analysing a large corpus of 
text drawn from research papers published in logic, philosophy, mathematics 
and biology journals, Mizrahi empirically tests these predictions. While he 
finds some support for the predictions, he also finds some results that require 
further explanation. 
David Over and Nicole Cruz are both psychologists of reasoning. Their 
chapter, ‘Philosophy and the psychology of conditional reasoning’, is a wide-
ranging discussion of recent empirical work on conditional statements and its 
relationship to philosophy. The authors cite an extensive array of empirical 
studies to argue in favour of a Bayesian account of conditionals and against a 
mental model account. They conclude that much psychological research on 
conditionals has paid too little attention to philosophical and logical work. 
Remedying that oversight has already led to improved empirical studies, and 
promises to go further. 
In their chapter, ‘Folk judgments about conditional excluded middle’, the 
philosophers Michael J. Shaffer and James Beebe employ empirical studies 
to motivate a novel analysis of so-called Bizet/Verdi conditionals:  
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• If Bizet and Verdi had been compatriots, Bizet would have been 
Italian.  
• If Bizet and Verdi had been compatriots, Verdi would have been 
French.  
Across three experiments Shaffer and Beebe find evidence for Alchourrón 
et al.’s (1985) ‘belief revision’ theory of counterfactuals, in line with the 
tradition of the Ramsey Test. Interestingly, they reject the alternative 
accounts from Lewis (1973) and Stalnaker (1981) by coordinating analyses 
from both quantitative and qualitative data. 
 
The experimental philosophy of logic and mathematics has been quietly 
thriving for some time. We hope that this collection will form an 
indispensable resource for future research in the field. 
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